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The main focus of the thesis is the concept of jihad and martyrdom in Islam. It 
seeks to present these religious ideas from very diverse perspectives and argues 
that seemingly discontinuous dimensions are all parts of the nature of the 
phenomenon. In the world of Islam, religion is an omnipresent aspect of a 
public life. Hence, the historical experience, culture, socio-economics, and 
politics, they all manifest in religious narratives. Martyrdom embodies these 
complexities as well. Historically and culturally, martyrdom has been perceived 
as an expression of utmost activism in the struggle of a believer for the 
betterment of the Islamic society. Leading a responsible and truthful life 
sometimes demands the ultimate sacrifice of one’s life for the cause. This 
worldly responsibility for the well-being of the Islamic umma is one dimension 
of complex dynamics of the Islamist movements like the Palestinian Hamas. For 
them, martyrdom is only one moment, the climax, which requires leading the 
whole life as a responsible believer in the first place. In this sense, martyrdom is 
a celebration of a meaningful life rather than death. This commitment of Hamas 
to the community, its radical understanding of the politics of the struggle, along 
with the particular socio-economic, and political situation in Palestine form an 






Práce se zabývá koncepty džihádu a mučednictví v náboženském systému 
islámu. Hlavním cílem práce je představit tyto náboženské koncepty z různých 
perspektiv a dokázat, že dimenze s fenoménem mučednictví zdánlivě 
nesouvisející jsou jeho integrální součástí. Ve světě islámu je náboženství 
všudypřítomným aspektem veřejného života. Proto se v něm manifestují i jevy, 
které jsou od něho na první pohled odlišné jako historická zkušenost, kulturní 
hodnoty, socioekonomická sféra nebo politika. Také fenomén mučednictví 
v sobě zahrnuje všechny tyto prvky. Z historického a kulturního hlediska bylo 
mučednictví vždy vnímáno jako výraz nejvyššího aktivismu ve snaze věřícího o 
zdokonalení muslimské společnosti. Avšak k tomu, aby člověk žil zodpovědným 
a smysluplným životem, je někdy zapotřebí obětovat pro dobro věci i vlastní 
život. Tato světská zodpovědnost za blaho celé společnosti je jedním z mnoha 
rozměrů složité dynamiky islamistických hnutí, mezi něž se řadí i palestinský 
Hamás. V ideologii hnutí je mučednictví pouze jedním momentem, konečným 
vyvrcholením, kterému ale předchází celý život zodpovědného věřícího. V tomto 
smyslu je pak mučednictví oslavou smysluplného života spíše než smrti. 
Zodpovědnost vůči komunitě, která je pevnou součástí ideologie Hamásu a jeho 
radikální chápání vedení konfliktu s Izraelem spolu se specifickou 
socioekonomickou a politickou situací v Palestině pak utvářejí program, se 
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The present thesis attempts to depict the concept of martyrdom in Islam and its 
contemporary interpretations epitomized by what is called “suicide terrorism.” 
We will use the Palestinian Hamas as a case study because the contemporary 
radical Islam is so diverse that no single theory can explain the complexity of the 
phenomenon. Motivations and reasoning of global Salafi-Jihadists for 
perpetrating the suicide attacks are very different from the ones of traditional 
local movements like Hamas or Hezbollah that perceive themselves as national 
liberation movements. Therefore, we have deliberately chosen to focus on a 
single organization because understanding the local conditions is fundamental 
for understanding the movement itself.    
Notwithstanding that self-immolations are a widespread phenomenon and 
organizations which perpetrate them are a frequently discussed topic of many 
academic disciplines, researching on the subject is not void of problems. 
Likewise martyrdom, also Hamas -- the Islamic Resistance movement -- is often 
misunderstood and painted in a reductionist way in black-and-white. Contrary 
to this portrait, we would like to demonstrate that Hamas is not a mere military 
organization devoted to a single cause. Rather the very opposite is true. Hamas 
aims to be as pluralistic and all-encompassing as Islam itself (in a way, it has no 
other choice if it is a truly Islamic organization). It strives to penetrate and 
influence all aspects of people’s life and acts in various ways simultaneously. 
Hamas sees itself first and foremost as a religious movement and all its other 
activities are derived from there. Hence, it can act as a political party, a national 
government, a communal provider of social welfare, and a militant struggler at 
the same time. 
To the different understanding of martyrdom and varied cultural perceptions of 
the subject attests the terminology which serves to describe the act of self-
immolation. For what the Palestinians call “martyrdom operation,” the Western 
academic discourse uses the term “suicide terrorism.” The discrepant labels 
refer to the fact that both sides ascribe to the same act a very different meaning. 
What the West perceives as a suicide of an ill-minded individual is for most of 
the Palestinians and the wider Islamic world a selfless act of self-sacrifice which 
9 
 
brings benefit to the whole nation. Nevertheless, even the Muslim community 
itself has not arrived to a definite consensus on the issue and religious 
authorities carry on in discussions whether it is a suicide or not. Since we are 
not setting out to settle the debate among Muslim sages, we do not make any 
distinction between the two terms and use them both in the same way, notably 
because the notion “suicide terrorism” is well established in our academic 
discourse. 
Suicide terrorism represents a topic which arises many controversies and how 
many studies on the subject have been written, perhaps so many views have 
been adopted. Moreover, suicide terrorism is due to its nature a politically and 
emotionally loaded issue. In the face of vivid media coverage on terrorist 
attacks, it is difficult to stay indifferent and unbiased. As Jeroen Gunning 
observes, a frequent phenomenon within the scholarly discourse on suicide 
terrorism is seeing the subject of the study through the dichotomous lens of “us” 
and the evil, daemonic “other.”1 This rigid division inherently leads to adoption 
of various kinds of biased views.  
A different kind of logic is also peculiar to the Western scholarly work. It usually 
neatly presents concise overviews of schools of thought, ideas, concepts, and 
their historical development but it appears to fail to pay attention to the 
arguments, opinions, reasoning, and understanding of the issue by the “other” 
or to take them seriously. Our way of thinking is very good in classifying, 
labelling, and chronologizing, and as a result, it sometimes tends to simplify the 
complexity and interconnectivity of realities on the ground and see the suicide 
terrorism as a simple phenomenon with a clear-cut explanation. 
Hence, the present work attempts to contribute to the outgoing academic debate 
by pointing out the complex nature of suicide terrorism. Throughout the paper 
we will touch upon the historical, cultural, religious, and sociological causes that 
nourish the prevalence of the phenomenon. These dimensions and their 
concurrence are often overlooked and a simple explanation is sought -- in a 
sense that those people who strap themselves with an explosive belt and set 
forth to kill civilians are either totally insane individuals with suicidal 
                                                          
1 J. Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008, p. 5. 
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tendencies, religious fanatics or people who have been brainwashed by terrorist 
organizations. Yet, we will attempt to demonstrate that the reality is far more 
complex and martyrdom in Palestine is not perceived as a mere suicide but 
rather as a “complex social performance expressive of key cultural values.”2 On 
the other hand, the political and strategic dimensions of suicide terrorism will 
be adverted only on the margins because they have been plentifully discussed 
elsewhere. 
Another aim of the paper is to present the “view from within” the Muslim 
community, the Palestinian society and the Hamas movement itself. We need to 
sort of put ourselves into someone else’s shoes to genuinely comprehend his 
views and motivations for a certain kind of behaviour. A lot of scholarly work 
tries to apply its own logic in explaining the phenomenon of suicide terrorism 
and largely downplays the logic of those who promote and execute such means. 
Therefore we will try to show the “other” view, the “view from within” as seen 
through the eyes of the “other.” We seek to outline how the “other” understands 
the issue but without any intention to judge the legitimacy of such 
understanding. However, empathy shall not be mistaken for sympathy since 
trying to understand the “other” view is not equivalent to advocating it.3 
The first chapter provides a brief synopsis of the academic discussion on suicide 
terrorism. Four main approaches how to study the subject are introduced. The 
opening chapter also contains a few words on the methodology applied in the 
paper. We will draw mainly on literature that is grounded in field research and 
takes into account complex situation on the ground. 
The next two chapters describe the concept of jihad and martyrdom in Islam. 
We will see that these historical concepts are still a living tradition which is 
deeply rooted in collective consciousness. Religious traditions in the Muslim 
world play a role of cultural norms that can be modified and reinterpreted to 
answer the problems that the Muslim community is contended with nowadays. 
The fourth and fifth chapters describe how these religious concepts and cultural 
norms are interpreted in Palestine. It will be argued that the Palestine occupies 
                                                          
2 N. Whitehead and N. Abufarha, “Suicide, Violence, and Cultural Conceptions of Martyrdom in 
Palestine”, Social Research 75.2 (2008): p. 397. 
3 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 15. 
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a special status within the Muslim world. Hence, the gravity of the local 
situation allows for more radical conceptions. Out of the solidarity with the 
Palestinian cause, the religious authorities are willing to give a green light to 
martyrdom operations which are deemed forbidden in places like contemporary 
Iraq, the centre of suicide bombings, where the insurgents have plenty of other 
resources to resist the foreign presence in the country. 
Last chapter is devoted specifically to the Palestinian Hamas which occupies a 
special position within the Palestinian society due to its commitment to social 
welfare. Contrary to Palestinian secularist movements like Fatah, Hamas 
combines national struggle for self-determination with religious values. But on 
the top of that, it is not interested only in the armed struggle against Israel 
infused with religious spirit like the Islamic Jihad. Hamas also aims at bringing 
the Palestinian society back to Islamic values.  
12 
 
1. DEFINING METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Our Western understanding of what is Hamas and especially what is its message 
in regard to suicide bombings seems to be very incoherent. While some scholars 
portray it as a one-dimensional organization devoted to terror, others speak 
about a charitable movement in charge of extensive social network. Different 
academic disciplines hold different views of the movement’s nature. Following is 
a presentation of four main academic approaches to the logic and actions of the 
Palestinian Hamas. 
1. As an Islamic religious movement in substance, Hamas has been a 
subject of research for the discipline of Islamic studies. This approach 
is in principle focused on theoretical knowledge and intellectual history. 
Traditional Islamic studies prioritize to describe Islamic views on various 
issues as captured in doctrinal texts over the work with empirical data. 
While this theoretical framework is essential for understanding Hamas’ 
ideology, we also need to take into account that specific conditions on the 
ground re-shape and re-define actual interpretation of Islamic dogmas. 
To be able to address a people’s needs, these dogmas need to be re-
interpreted in order to resonate with living reality. The history of 
religious traditions demonstrates that such dynamism is an integral part 
of monotheistic religiosity. Hence, the Islamic studies perspective as such 
is not capable of grasping the whole complexity of the phenomenon.4 
 
2. Likewise, scholars and analysts involved in the security-oriented 
approach of terrorism studies have often been accused of relying overly 
on textual sources while “never meeting a terrorist” and thus overlooking 
the social and personal context of the problem studied.5 Moreover, their 
primary aim is national security, and they are thus prone to using the 
utilitarian logic stating “let’s understand the problem so that we can fight 
it better” than to strive for more objective formulations. This attitude 
stems from the problem that policy making requires concrete goals and 
                                                          
4 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 4. 
5 Ibid., p. 5.  
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milestones and does not appreciate soaring phenomenological debates. 
Therefore, policy advisors have a leaning toward clear-cut opinions and 
decisions rather than toward open-end discussions on the subject. 
 
A notable example of the security-oriented approach which focuses solely 
on demonizing the movement and its use of violence is Matthew Levitt’s 
book Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad.6 
Levitt presents Hamas as a unitary organization entirely devoted to 
terror. He disagrees with the portrayal of a complex, multi-dimensional 
movement which possesses a number of separate wings devoted to a wide 
spectrum of purposes. Levitt denounces this “myth of disparate wings.”7 
In his view, Hamas pursues a single goal which is the destruction of 
Israel. The organization’s political and social activities are meant to serve 
this absolute goal. Not only does Levitt disregard socio-historical and 
political context, he also links Hamas to Al-Qaeda’s financing networks 
and suggests that Hamas might attack “Western interests”, thus widening 
its scope of targets.8  
 
3. The perception of Hamas as a movement dedicated to one single cause is 
not unusual among political scientists either. Large volumes of 
political studies describe the movement as a political organization which 
streamlines all its activities to achieve its political goals. Da’wa, the 
Hamas-run social network, is regarded as political opportunism. 
Likewise, the suicide bombings against Israel are considered to serve the 
same purpose: increasing the movement’s appeal among Palestinians. 
While there is no doubt that Hamas uses suicide bombings 
instrumentally, it is also engaged in a myriad of other activities, most of 
them social and communal, in which it arguably believes with the same 
intensity.  A number of scholars in political studies thus tend to overlook 
                                                          
6 For detailed analysis of Levitt’s flawed argumentation see: S. Roy (rev.), “M. Levitt, Hamas”, 
Middle East Policy 14.2 (2007): 149-174, available from: 
http://www.politicalreviewnet.com/polrev/reviews/MEPO/R_1061_1924_149_1007480.asp 
(8/6/2013); cf. S. Erlanger (rev.), “Militant Zeal”, The New York Times, June 25, 2006, 
available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/books/review/25erlanger.html?_r=0 
(8/6/2013); cf. Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 23. 
7 M. Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, New Haven –
London: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 2. 
8 Ibid., p. 167 and 204. 
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the “ends” and focus their attention on the “means” that serve reaching 
those “ends” -- in Hamas’ case physical and spiritual liberation of the 
land of Palestine and its people -- thinking that the “means” are also the 
“ends”.9 Moreover, the assumption that Hamas acquires legitimacy only 
through covert brainwashing again neglects the social context. It will be 
argued thereinafter that Hamas builds on a social and cultural 
recognition of the concept of martyrdom which is broader and deeper 
than mere political manipulation.10 
In contrast to such limited studies, there exist multidisciplinary studies 
focused on politics which base their argumentation on a long-term field 
research. As an example we can mention the work of Jeroen Gunning, in 
particular his book on Hamas called Hamas in Politics: Democracy, 
Religion, Violence. He has also written extensively on the theory he 
applies when studying the movement, promoting what he calls a 
“critically self-reflective methodology.”11 Gunning argues that many 
Western experts studying Hamas adopt a biased view due to their 
unwillingness to “humanize the other” and to overcome the “us and 
them” dichotomy which sees the world in black-and-white.12 He also 
denounces misleading generalizing labels like “religious terrorism” that 
are in essence empty concepts with no real meaning.13  
Despite the fact that such studies reflect the complexity of reality on the 
ground, they sometimes struggle to cope with entanglement of politics 
and religion. A state of affairs that is natural and even sought-after in 
Islam is seen from a Western perspective as a dangerous thing which 
needs to be avoided at all times. Therefore, even Gunning in his attempt 
to “humanize the other” appears to downplay the role of religion in 
movement’s decision making in order to show that Hamas’ leaders are 
                                                          
9 K. Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, London – Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006, p. 7-8. 
Hroub defines the ‛ends’ as an “extent to which politics is ingrained in Islam, whereas the 
‛means’ issue reflects the controversy on the use of violence to achieve the ‛ends’.” 
10 Cf. M. Litvak, “‛Martyrdom is Life’: Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas”, Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010): 716-734. 
11 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 3. 
12 Ibid., p. 5. 
13 J. Gunning and R. Jackson, “What’s so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?”, Critical Studies 




capable of pragmatic decisions. Still, religiosity and pragmatism are not 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary -- they coexist and complement each 
other. Hence, Hamas can show adaptability with regard to new situations 
without any need to compromise on its religious principles.  
 
4. Having said that, Gunning’s studies can still be considered representative 
of a sensitive, balanced approach based on fieldwork which operates 
on empirical level and strives for sincerity but does not advocate the 
movement. Within this last category, we include all studies of a similar 
nature as described above, including works of anthropology, sociology or 
political science.14 They will serve as a main reference point for our 
attempt to describe how the Palestinian Hamas interprets the Islamic 
concept of martyrdom. 
Since we seek to deploy the most comprehensive approach possible, we will use 
a combination of Islamic studies and sociology. To describe the concept of jihad 
and martyrdom in modern Islam we will draw on works by authors from the 
Muslim world as well as by Western scholars, among others by Ayatollah 
Murtada Mutahhari, ‛Ali Shari‛ati, David Cook, Meir Hatina or Assaf 
Moghadam. The perspective of classical Islamic studies is very helpful for 
defining the doctrinal basis of the ideology of martyrdom in Islam but this 
approach fails to sufficiently explain why this very topic of all Islamic concepts 
occupies central position in the religious life of the Palestinian society. To be 
able to outline the reasons for wide popular support and legitimacy that this 
concept enjoys, we have to look at the realities on the ground. And this is where 
the sociological approach grounded in field research takes over. 
  
                                                          
14 Notably: Gunning, Hamas in Politics; Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide; K. Hroub, Hamas: 
Political Thought and Practice, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestinian Studies, 2000; S. 
Mishal and A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000; ‛A. Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, Northampton: 
Olive Branch Press, 2007. 
16 
 
2. THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF JIHAD 
 
2.1 Jihad -- Warfare or a Peaceful Spiritual Effort? 
No Islamic sacred text provides us with a clear unambiguous explanation of the 
concept of jihad. A literal translation from Arabic may be “effort” or “striving”. 
In the Qur’an, the word is usually followed by the formula fi sabil Allah which 
means “in the way of God” or “in the path of God”.15 Yet how to describe the 
“striving in the path of Allah”? Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, an important figure 
of the Iranian Islamic revolution and one of the foremost Shi’ite ideologists of 
modern jihad, explains the way of God as “the very path of the well-being and 
betterment of human society. It is the way of justice, truth, and human 
liberty.”16  
As such, the concept allows for wide range of interpretations, varying from pure 
spiritual effort of combating one’s lower self to actual warfare. Apologists of 
Islam concerned with improving its image in the world would argue that the 
primary meaning of jihad is peaceful and solely spiritual. It is the believer’s life-
long effort to be a good Muslim, to fight against his lower instincts and urges, 
and to actively oppose any kind of wrongdoing.17 Indeed, the term does not 
necessarily embrace violence but if we look at the historical context and the way 
it has been practiced, connotations to warfare are apparent.  
In his Understanding Jihad David Cook argues that “the Qur’an does not 
support a completely nonviolent interpretation of jihad,” because most of the 
verses clearly refer to actual fighting.18 The military success of the emerging 
Muslim community is perceived as a miracle which attests to the divinity of 
Allah’s promise to lead them to victory. Evidence to the veracity of this promise 
may be found in the conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries which led to 
                                                          
15 M. Abedi and G. Legenhausen, “Introduction”, in M. Abedi and G. Legenhausen (eds.), Jihad 
and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, North Haledon, N.J.: Islamic Publications 
International, 2005, p. 2. 
16 M. Taleqani, “Jihad and Shahadat”, in M. Abedi and G. Legenhausen (eds.), Jihad and 
Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, North Haledon, N.J.: Islamic Publications 
International, 2005, p. 50. 
17 See for example: L. Fatoohi, Jihad in the Qur’an: The Truth from the Source [Kindle file], 
Birmingham: Luna Plena Publishing, 2009. 
18 D. Cook, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California 
Press, 2005, p. 32-33. 
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the great expansion of territory under the control of Islam (Dar al-Islam).19  
This is not to suggest that Islam as a religion is of violent nature. The institution 
of jihad shall not serve expansion of territory as such or increasing material 
wealth. Additionally, jihad is not waged for the purpose of forced conversion or 
annihilation of unbelievers. 
The armed jihad also has a strong spiritual meaning and encompasses the 
element of justice.20 Apologists of the peaceful nature of jihad and its advocates 
alike see jihad as a “just struggle for freedom and human rights.”21 Ayatollah 
Murtada Mutahhari, theologian, jurist, and another ideologist of the Iranian 
revolution, claims:  
“Islam is a religion that sees its duty and commitment to be the formation of the society. Islam 
came to reform society and to form a nation. Its mandate is the reform of the whole world… 
Islam is the religion which covers all activities of human life… It came to organize a state and a 
government.”22   
The ultimate goal of jihad is thus creation and expansion of Dar al-Islam that 
would establish preconditions under which “just political and social order” can 
evolve and Islam can be spread for the benefit of all humankind.23 Every Muslim 
is committed to fighting for justice, to fulfilling one of the basic Islamic concepts 
of al-amr bi-l- ma‛ruf wa-l-nahi ‛an al-munkar (enjoying the good and 
forbidding the wrongdoing); jihad can be understood as one way of doing so.24 
Therefore it is not viewed as an act of aggression but as a fight against 
oppression. One might say that this doctrine played a real part in the rapid 
spread of Islam during the first two centuries of its existence. Islam usually 
became the majority religion in the territories conquered by Muslim troops. 
Jihad has played an important role in the development of Islam and remains a 
central topic of Islamic theology and jurisprudence.25 
                                                          
19 Fatoohi, Jihad in the Qur’an [Kindle file]; Cook, Understanding Jihad, p. 13.  
20 Cook, Understanding Jihad, p. 7. 
21 Fatoohi, Jihad in the Qur’an [Kindle file]. 
22 M. Mutahhari, “Jihad in the Qur’an”, in M. Abedi and G. Legenhausen (eds.), Jihad and 
Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, North Haledon, N.J.: Islamic Publications 
International, 2005, p. 89. 
23 M. Knapp, “The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam,” Parameters 33.1 (2003): p. 83; See 
also M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004, p. 2. 
24 Cook, Understanding Jihad, p. 34-37. 
25 Ibid., p. 13. 
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Islamic jurists distinguish between defensive and offensive jihad. Offensive 
jihad which is fought outside Dar al-Islam is a collective duty incumbent upon a 
Muslim community (umma) as a whole without a need for every individual’s 
participation. It is meant as a last resort after the enemy refused either to 
convert to Islam or to pay a jizyah (poll-tax) and has to be authorized by a 
legitimate leader (although there are disputes between Sunnis and Shi‛ites 
regarding the identity of the legitimate authority). Another important condition 
is proportionality. Muslim jurists generally agree that war itself is an evil which 
becomes justifiable only under the condition that it avoids an even greater evil. 
Jihad should ultimately aim to establish peace.26 
Defensive jihad applies when Muslim territory is attacked from outside. Unlike 
offensive jihad, it demands the involvement of every Muslim if not through 
actual combat then through financial contributions or prayers.27 In case of 
foreign invasion, an individual does not need anyone’s approval to join the 
jihad. As Islamic law has it, “a woman should go out even without the consent of 
her husband, a son can go too without the permission of his parent, a slave 
without the approval of his master, and the employee without the leave of his 
employer.”28 The jihad we experience today is legitimized as defensive. The 
rationale for this interpretation will be presented in the second section of the 
chapter.  
We have demonstrated that at the times when Islamic community was 
expanding territorially, jihad was also understood as spiritual warfare. Non-
violent spiritual interpretation of jihad became prominent only after the Islamic 
conquest lost its drive.29 The notion of a spiritual fight against human lower 
instincts and passions was formulated by one of the greatest Islamic 
philosophers of all times -- Al-Ghazali -- and played an important role especially 
in mystical streams within Islam.30  
Nevertheless, armed jihad has never been forgotten. Throughout the history, 
Muslim lands were periodically in jeopardy as a result of the Crusades, 
                                                          
26 Abedi and Legenhausen, “Introduction”, p. 19-23. 
27 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 2. 
28 “The Qaradawi Fatwas”, Middle East Quarterly 11.3 (2004): p. 2. 
29 Cook, Understanding Jihad, p. 31. 
30 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Mongolian invasions and Western colonialist interests, respectively, and armed 
jihad gained new forms. 
 
2.2 Evolution of the Idea and Contemporary Interpretations of Jihad 
Notably, the invasions of Mongols were of a special importance for the 
contemporary ideology of jihad. Unlike Christian Crusaders, in this case the 
invaders were Muslims. Campaigning against them meant fighting Muslim 
brethren while tradition strictly forbade such a state of disruption within the 
umma. The Qur’an maintains that “fitna is worse than slaughter.”31 Fitna means 
chaos or disunity, referring to the state of civil war which occurred after Prophet 
Muhammad’s death and ultimately led to the Sunni-Shi‛a split.32 The dilemma 
was resolved by Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya, a famous jurist, who branded 
Mongols as infidels on the grounds that instead of the Shari’a, they followed the 
legal code of Genghis Khan.33 Ibn Taymiyya’s rulings later served as a source of 
inspiration for other theorists on jihad, namely Sayyid Qutb, arguably the most 
prominent figure of contemporary jihad. 
A new phase of the radical reinterpretation of jihad began with the 
establishment of Western dominance over the Muslim world during the 19th 
century. In reaction to decline of Muslim societies that were now in a 
subordinate position -- a state which is not inherent to Islam -- a new ideology 
called Salafism emerged at the turn of the 20th century with the goal of restoring 
Islamic glory of the past. 
The Salafists represent a diverse revivalist movement. While there have always 
been reformists in the history of Islam, they were mostly individuals or very 
small groups. The revolutionary thing about the emergence of Salafists at the 
beginning of the last century was that part of them became political and had an 
ambition to penetrate state establishments and speak for whole countries.  
All Salafist movements share a common religious creed but they differ in 
applying these religious beliefs and principles to contemporary issues and 
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problems.34 The core of the Salafi creed is the concept of tawhid, the unity of 
God. Salafists believe that God has created the whole universe in its perfection 
all at once. To maintain this perfection, one has to submit himself to God’s 
guidance which is recorded in its pure form in the Qur‛an and in hadiths, 
collections of stories and traditions believed to be uttered by the Prophet and 
members of his household. Hence, the only way to protect God’s unity is to 
strictly follow the authority of the Qur‛an and the personal example of the 
Prophet Muhammad and his companions. According to Salafists, any other 
source of guidance beyond the Qur‛an and Sunna leads Muslims away from the 
righteous path because it does not represent the original revelation. Any belief 
or action which is not mentioned in the Qur‛an or hadiths is an innovation 
(bid‘a) that threatens tawhid. For this reason Salafists also reject the authority 
of the official Sunni schools of jurisprudence because the supreme legislator is 
God as mentioned in the Qur‛an. To legislate is a power reserved only for God, 
not for humans.35 While humans may formulate regulations to guide their lives, 
these regulations can never be equivalent to God’s law. But this notion is not 
restricted only to Islam. The idea that it is sin to substitute divine truth with 
man-made laws is common to Judaism and Christianity as well. 
The next stage of the Salafi argument is that disobedience to the Shari‛a in its 
entirety has caused the decadence of Islam and the supremacy of human-made 
laws over eternal divine justice. For Salafists, the Golden Age of Islam was the 
time of the Prophet Muhammad followed by Rashidun, the era of the four 
Rightly Guided Caliphs. These times were the times of the original and 
righteous umma, the times of the Pious Ancestors (as-Salaf as-saleh) and 
Muslim community as a whole is obliged to return to this authentic faith.36 The 
very question of how to restore the genuine Islam is exactly the point where the 
individual factions of Salafism diverge. Different interpretations of the 
aforementioned religious precepts and their divergent applications to contextual 
reality have produced three major factions within the Salafi community.37 
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The first strategy focuses primarily on promoting da‛wa and advocates 
individual responsibility in spreading Islam. Its followers operate informally at 
the grassroots level and stay away from politics. They see their mission as an 
analogy to the Meccan period of Islam when the Prophet and his followers were 
a vulnerable minority and thus preferred propagation of a new faith to a 
rebellion. At that time the Prophet Muhammad and his nascent community 
were repressed but they remained peaceful for the sake of spreading Islam. This 
patient strategy aims at purification of religion and gradual transformation of 
the society into a righteous umma. Until this objective is achieved the followers 
should refrain from any engagement in politics, because a society that does not 
yet understand the religious principles is very likely to succumb to corruption or 
injustice if politically active.38 
One of the representatives of this Salafi faction is Muhammad Ilyas’ movement 
Tablighi Jamaat founded in India in the 1920s. His disciples strictly and literally 
imitate the life of the Prophet, in the belief that through these everyday practices 
they can get rid of all bad habits as well as impious thoughts and behaviour. An 
example is that one “would sleep, if possible, just as tradition has it that 
Mohammed slept, lying on his right side on the ground, facing Mecca with his 
hand cupped beneath his cheek.”39 In order to eliminate as many bad influences 
as possible, they tend to isolate themselves from the rest of the society and 
break the bonds with the outer world. 
Critics of this strategy argue that it has been unable to meet the needs and 
concerns of the people exactly because it prizes being out of touch with the 
world. That is why it has been challenged by another faction of the Salafists who 
believe the society must be changed by political means, through state organs. 
Political activism is inherent to Islam that understands itself as an all-
encompassing guide for the life of the individual as well as the whole Muslim 
community. This strategy maintains the necessity of engagement in political 
arena, which is particularly important because it has a direct impact on social 
justice. By bringing about political reforms, social and political conditions can 
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be established to create a true Muslim state based on Shari‛a which is the only 
just system guaranteeing individuals absolute divine freedom. The 
decolonization of the Muslim world in the 20th century raised hopes that this 
dream might come true and seemed to promise the rise of Islamist states.  
However, instead of restoring Islamic law, the new Muslim leaders turned to 
secularism, nationalism, and the imitation of Western models. The feeling of 
disillusionment with the new rulers and their repression against these political 
activists convinced some of them that da‛wa and political reforms are not viable 
strategies for the establishment of an Islamist state.40  
This brings us to the third strategy called Salafi-Jihad which does not believe in 
the possibility of changing the social order without taking violent action against 
those who threaten the tawhid. According to Salafi-Jihadists the society as a 
whole, including the fellow Muslims who do not obey the same rules, finds itself 
in a state of jahiliyyah. The term refers to the pre-Islamic period when 
humankind was ruled by its own ignorance and unbridled desire. Sayyid Qutb, 
one of the greatest ideologists of Salafi-Jihad, defines jahili society as  
“any society other than the Islamic society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say 
that any society is a jahili society if it does not dedicate itself to submission to Allah alone in its 
beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and in its legal norms. According to this 
definition, all the societies existing in the world today are jahili.”41  
Life within the jahili society is not possible for a faithful Muslim. He has to cut 
himself off of this rotten surrounding and join a “vanguard” of the few like-
minded true Muslims. This vanguard is supposed to turn against the false 
Muslims and all the non-believers, undertake the renovation of Islam and found 
a new state, based on the Qur’an.42 Qutb argues:  
“Islam cannot accept any compromise with jahiliyyah… Islam cannot accept or agree to a 
situation which is half-Islam and half-jahiliyyah… The mixing and co-existence of the truth and 
falsehood is impossible. Command belongs to Allah, or else to jahiliyyah.”43  
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Declaring those Muslims who do not share the same ideology to be idolaters or 
hypocrites, i.e. takfiris, gives the rationale for violent revolt against them 
without causing fitna within the Muslim community. As mentioned above, the 
Sunni tradition universally condemns any violence against fellow Muslims and 
maintains that even a bad ruler is still better than fitna. Nevertheless, the charge 
of jahiliyyah presents the justification for waging war on co-believers.44 
Secularist Muslim regimes, the Shi‛ite branch of Islam, various mystic orders 
and other Islamic sects are all legitimate targets and according to this ideology 
their followers can be killed.  
At the beginning, the Salafi-Jihad was oriented to the “near enemy” represented 
by domestic corrupted regimes. Salafi-Jihadists sought to overthrow local 
Muslim governments in order to establish an Islamist state. However, their 
strategy has changed over time. Especially after the Afghan war the problem 
started to be seen not as local but rather global and priority was given to 
tackling first the “far enemy” symbolized by the West, especially by the United 
States. The West was seen as controlling the countries of the Muslim world and 
local leaders were considered puppets of this global power.45 For this reason 
they have to deal with the West first and domestic kufr comes afterwards. 
Obviously, Salafi-Jihadis do not have any interest in politics because they do not 
recognize the legitimacy of the current social order or political system. For the 
same reason they do not encompass any social component such as charitable 
work or management of social institutions. They tend to be totally anti-
systematic and focus solely on military operations. But they do not belong to 
local nationalistic movements fighting for self-determination like the 
Palestinian Hamas or the Islamic Jihad; instead, they see themselves as 
members of a transnational group. In their ideology they reject the concept of 
national boundaries, hence their battlefield is global and they have no particular 
interest in a Palestinian state.46  
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Not having any ties with the society of outer world also means that they have no 
need to compromise on their radical and militant interpretation of religious 
symbols. Salafists who engage in politics and preaching da‛wa are firmly based 
in the centre of the society they wish to occupy. In order to achieve this, they 
have to be moderate. Salafi-Jihadis are the exact opposite. They wish to distance 
themselves from society in order to attack it.47  
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3. INTRODUCTION OF THE NOTION OF ISTISHHAD48 
 
Above every virtue there is another virtue, but there is no other virtue higher than being 
killed in the way of God.49 
Prophet Muhammad 
 
As we described in the previous chapter, Islam has placed an emphasis on 
power and fighting for a right cause in the path of God. Expressed in the words 
of Ayatollah Mutahhari, “the Muslim community is a community of power and 
force. Islam is a religion of power. It produces mujahidin [fighters on the path of 
God].”50 With a few exceptions, Muslims have never been an oppressed minority 
and Islam has usually been in a superior position. This historical experience has 
created an image of martyrdom which is different from concepts in other 
monotheistic religions. In Islam, contrary to Judaism or Christianity, a martyr is 
not epitomized as being passively tortured to death but rather as taking a 
proactive role while seeking out death in the battlefield:51  
“Shahadat is not a death which is imposed by an enemy upon our warriors. It is a death which is 
desired by our warriors, selected with all of the awareness, logic, reasoning, intelligence, 
understanding, consciousness and alertness that a human being can have.”52  
Thus, martyrdom has always been associated with jihad.53 
Similarly to Greek from which the word “martyr” originates, shahid (pl. 
shuhada) in Arabic means either “witness” or “martyr”, depending on the 
context. The root SH.H.D signifies “giving testimony (of faith)”-- the shahada -- 
which every Muslim utters in daily prayers by declaring that there is no god but 
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Allah, and that Muhammad is His Messenger.54 Also, being martyred means to 
testify to the divinity of the cause for which the shahid fights.  
The Qur’an does not contain any systematic conceptual idea of istishhad.55 
Occasional references to the subject are disorganized and often ambiguous, 
because Qur’an primarily uses the word “shahid” with the sense of “witness” 
while a martyr is referred to as someone “killed in the path of Allah.”56 
Nevertheless, Qur’an is clear about the fact that martyrs are entitled to special 
rewards: 
“And do not think of those who have been killed in the way of Allah as dead; they are rather 
living with their Lord, well-provided for. Rejoicing in what their Lord has given them of His 
bounty, and they rejoice for those who stayed behind and did not join them, knowing that they 
have nothing to fear and shall not grieve.” [Qur’an 3:169-170]57 
The close proximity to God and the opportunity to enjoy all pleasures of the 
paradise testify to the special status of a martyr that is associated with glory and 
high honor. The martyr is considered a special being encircled with the aura of 
sanctity. Islamic tradition maintains that the very first drop of martyr’s blood 
washes off all his sins.58 At the same time, such a heroic manner of death 
purifies not only the soul but the body, too. The body, blood and even the 
garments of the shahid become spiritualized because of the divinity of his 
sacrifice. Therefore, shahid’s body, contrary to general rules, is not to be washed 
prior to burial and is laid down to the grave in the same blood-soaked clothes.59 
Reportedly, the bodies of martyrs even smell like paradise.60 
As indicated above, martyrdom is viewed as the most desirable means of death 
and the emerging Muslim community distinguished itself from other faiths by 
the number of believers who had no fear of death and deliberately sought to be 
martyred:  
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“In the early days of Islam, many Muslims had a special spirit, which may be called the spirit of 
longing for shahadat… We find that during the early days of Islam everyone, whether young or 
old, high or low, had this longing. Sometimes the people came to the Prophet and expressed this 
desire. Islam does not allow suicide. They wanted to take part in jihad, and to be killed while 
doing their duty. They requested the Prophet to pray to God to grant them shahadat.”61   
Nevertheless, the privilege to decide who is to be raised among the ranks of 
shuhada is bestowed upon God only.62 The most determining condition is the 
right intention of the combatant.63 To concisely demonstrate what the right 
intention is, let us cite a short story from the life of the Prophet: 
“A man asked the noble Prophet, ‛Messenger of God! [What is the reward of] a poor person who 
goes to the battlefield for the sake of booty?’ The Prophet repeated three times, ‛He has no divine 
reward.’ [Another person] asked the noble Prophet, ‛Is the one who goes to the battlefield in 
order to test his own courage or to see fame properly called mujahid fi sabil Allah (striver in the 
way of God)?’ ‛No!’ he replied. ‛Then who can properly be called mujahid fi sabil Allah?’ The 
Prophet answered, ‛[The one who strives so] that God’s word becomes the uppermost.’”64  
Yet, one cannot become shahid only by dying in the way of God. Becoming a 
shahid also requires leading the whole life of a responsible, active believer. 
Istishhad is only a culmination of such a responsible life. Sometimes, the only 
way to live a true and meaningful live is to die by choice when there is no other 
option.65 But that is every believer’s responsibility to decide. 
When the Muslim community became well established at the end of the 8th 
century and jihad started to be interpreted not only as fighting the enemy but 
also as fighting one’s lower self, this extension of the initial meaning had an 
impact on the definition of martyrdom as well. Out of the desire to enjoy the 
status of a martyr and the admiration connected to it, new categories of 
istishhad were developed.66  
Most of the additional categories have only little to do with actual warfare. 
Needless to list them all, we will give only a limited number of examples. 
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Besides more traditional categories like dying by drowning, giving birth, while 
seeking knowledge, or guarding the frontiers of Islam, there exist quite unusual 
definitions of martyrdom like dying of lovesickness or dying from washing 
oneself ritually in snow.67 
However, these new concepts have never overshadowed the respectability of the 
fighting martyr and also the jurisprudents have never appeared to take these 
secondary definitions seriously into account.68 A combatant who died in the 
battlefield with the intention to raise the Word of Allah has always been the 
epitome of martyrdom and never lost its prominence, re-emerging and gaining 
new momentums in the course of history. The disruptive Ibn Taymiyya’s times 
of Mongol invasions were followed by the era of Western colonialism which 
brought new forms and interpretations; some of them we have introduced in the 
second chapter. Besides transnational Salafi-Jihad, a number of territorially-
limited initiatives fighting for the local cause have turned up, the most 
outstanding of which are nationalistic movements in Palestine aspiring to the 
establishment of Palestinian statehood. 
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4. THE CASE OF PALESTINE 
In all ages and centuries, when the followers of a faith and an idea have power, they 
guarantee their honor and lives with jihad. But when they are weakened and have no means 
whereby to struggle, they guarantee their lives, movement, faith, respect, honor, future and 
history with shahadat. Shahadat is an invitation to all generations, in all ages, if you cannot 
kill your oppressor, then die.69  
        ‛Ali Shari‛ati 
 
The vanguards of Palestinian “popular armed struggle” against Israel were 
secular-nationalist movements that began to undertake military actions to 
liberate the land of Palestine in the late 1950s.70 Led by Fatah, these secular 
movements were later unified in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
At that time, the Arab world was dominated by socialism and pan-Arab 
nationalism. Palestine was no exception to these ideologies. Yet, despite the 
secular nature of the PLO, the terminology which it used in reference to its 
armed struggle against Israel was not divorced from religious terms and 
concepts. Even though the religious symbols were depleted of their sacred 
meaning, Islam has never ceased to serve as a source of collective identity and 
cultural values.71 In fact, the role of religion in the Arab political arena is often 
misconstrued. Islam and its language, logic, and moral understanding are not 
necessarily considered absolutely binding by all Muslims. The importance of 
Islam does not consist in the literal obedience to its religious dogmas. The 
socially crucial role of Islam rather lies in its ability to shape narrative as well as 
discursive and moral argumentation. When political or military leaders want to 
make a strong statement, they employ Islamic motifs. When leaders want to 
persuade their listeners that their arguments are morally sound, they make 
reference to Islam. They would invoke religiously charged terms, or refer to the 
Prophet or a Muslim saint, and combine these references with those related to 
politics, economics or other fields. The Islamic references attest to the leader’s 
honesty and commitment to the community rather than to his personal 
devotion or piety.  
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Nevertheless, the Arab nationalism began to lose its appeal after the 1967 war 
with Israel. Arab states suffered a serious defeat and people started to openly 
question the capability of the establishment to cope with the continuing decline 
of their societies. The Palestinian cause was no longer at the top of the agenda 
because the Arab regimes had to deal with burning issues at home. And as the 
disillusionment with secularism and modernism continued, Arab people turned 
back to religion that gave them refuge in those difficult times. Consequently, 
Islamist movements -- by that time suppressed by ruling elites -- started to 
emerge as a challenge to the secularist regimes; the 1970s betokened a mass 
revival of religious values.72 This dichotomy should not be seen as a duel 
between modern nationalism and old-fashioned religiosity. Islamist movements 
rather politicized their Islam and promoted communal welfare and solidarity, 
while opposing exploitation and imperialism represented by the Arab 
nationalism. 
The revived religious sentiment also changed the narrative of the conflict with 
Israel.  Palestinian Islamist movements like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad 
reintroduced the traditional symbols with their original religious meaning and 
firmly based the Palestinian cause in historical-religious context. 73 These 
movements soon became a powerful alternative to the PLO. 
Within the religious discourse, the struggle against Israel has been interpreted 
as a defensive jihad and thus an individual obligation for every grown up, able- 
bodied male who is sane,74 because the confrontation has been seen as 
threatening not only the Palestinian identity but also fundamental principles of 
Islam. This interpretation was partly due to political manipulation.  
As we described above, Islam considers itself to be the only just system which 
corresponds with human nature and enables every individual to fully develop 
his capacities.75 Once a believer submits himself to Allah’s will, the very act 
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raises within him a “passion for freedom.”76 Having this passion, he is liberated 
from servitude, but is also prohibited from enslaving others.77 As a result,  
“oppression should never be given a chance to establish itself in society. A Muslim is supposed 
to be a conscientious individual responding with appropriate action to whatever injustice may 
be perpetrated in society, provided the chosen action does not produce a greater evil than the 
one it is directed against. A Muslim is thus a force for positive change, a citizen whose faith 
reinforces within him or her sense of responsibility to combat oppression.”78 
The responsibility for the welfare of the Muslim community is another 
fundamental aspect within Islam that is oriented much less individually in 
comparison to the Western culture. A righteous Muslim is ready to sacrifice his 
life for the benefit of the community in a selfless action whose ultimate objective 
is to reveal the truth and moral superiority of Islam.  
High morals of Palestinians and devotion to the cause in contrast to the Israeli 
society are often praised. According to the Islamic tradition, Jewish people cling 
to life whatever the cost because they are afraid to die -- knowing that they 
would have to pay for all the sins they have committed.79 The Qur’an says:  
“Indeed, you will find of them [Jews] the most attached to life, even more attached than those 
who associated other gods with Allah. Every one of them wishes to live for one thousand years. 
This long life, however, will not spare them punishment.” [Qur’an 2:96]80  
Since Muslims consider themselves pious and faithful believers, they have 
nothing to fear, not even death. Being martyred is a direct path to the heavens 
hence there is no reason to cling to the worldly life. Yet, there is nothing ecstatic 
or otherworldly about martyrdom. A believer can only decide to be a martyr if 
he is a good person and if he has led a good life in this world. He cannot be 
passive and hope to die as a martyr. A believer has a responsibility in this world 
and he has to carry it out. Even to die for it if it is deemed necessary. Otherwise, 
he is not a true believer. Not martyrdom but this worldly responsibility is the 
heart of Islamic movements like Hamas. Martyrdom is only one moment which 
requires a whole responsibly lived life at the first place. 
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The combination of readiness to sacrifice one’s life, moral obligation to forbid 
any wrongdoing, and the proactive nature of martyrdom in Islam -- which is a 
conscious and deliberate decision of the perpetrator -- has ultimately led to the 
justification of suicide missions as a form of self-sacrifice for the Palestinian 
cause and a legitimate means of warfare against Israel.81 As Meir Hatina argues, 
these “ideological foundations” were laid down by a manifesto bearing the name 
Readings in the Laws of Martyrdom issued and distributed in Palestine by the 
Islamic Jihad in 1988.82 
The Islamic Jihad together with Hamas have championed the suicide missions 
within the Sunni Islam and pawed the way for the deployment of self-
immolations by Salafi-Jihadists who, contrary to these local Islamist 
movements, perceive not only Western culture but also other Muslims and 
Muslim rulers as legitimate targets.83 Suicide bombings are thus like a double-
edged sword. Against the West they serve as a political tool -- a weapon against 
Western exploitation and imperialism. Within the Muslim world they represent 
a fundamentalist struggle for purity and supremacy of one version of religion 
over others. 
Until the emergence of Salafi-Jihad on a global scale, suicide bombings were 
mostly used in the Shi‛ite branch of Islam. Notably the Islamic Republic of Iran 
was renowned for its exaltation of martyrdom during the war with Iraq in 
1980s. At that time it was fighting its enemy with an innovative weapon known 
as “human wave attacks”:84 
“Each attack consisted of up to 20,000 children as young as twelve or thirteen who were sent 
into the line of fire and across minefields, with no backup. Exploding the mines with their own 
bodies, these children were used to clear the way for the soldiers who followed them. In return 
for their almost certain death, the children were provided with a plastic key that they wore 
around their neck. If they would die as martyrs, they were told, that key would open the gate to 
paradise.”85 
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The first bomb attack which implied death of the perpetrator occurred in 1981 in 
Beirut, Lebanon, where a pro-Iranian faction hit the Iraqi Embassy with a 
bomb-laden car. Subsequently, the tactic was mastered by Hezbollah, a 
Lebanese Shi‛a militia, that committed a large number of suicide attacks against 
foreign troops in the country.86 In 1992, when Israelis deported several hundred 
members of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad into the southern Lebanon, the 
Palestinians borrowed the know-how from their Lebanese brethren and soon 
after their return from Lebanese exile, they decided to use the suicide missions 
against Israel.87  
In the course of time, the “human bomb” became a symbol of the Palestinian 
struggle for self-determination, especially during the second intifada.88 
Nevertheless, the line between suicide and self-sacrifice was so blurred that 
Palestinians needed to seek the approval of religious authorities to win over 
popular support for martyrdom operations.89   
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5. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING SUICIDE MISSIONS 
Do not call them suicide bombers; call them shuhada, as they have not escaped the miseries 
of life. Life is sacred, but some things, like truth and justice, are more sacred than life. The 
shuhada are not desperate, they are hopeful… The al-Aqsa Intifada is horrendous, and there 
have been many casualties, but the Palestinians are not complaining. They are the victims, 
and they have the right to fight. The Israelis have guns, we have the human bomb. We love 
death, they love life. … Our history is made by blood and sweat.90 
        ‛Azzam Tamimi 
 
Despite the common understanding of martyrdom in Islam described 
hereinbefore as proactive and deliberately chosen, legitimacy of suicide 
operations arouses many controversies within the Muslim world. Due to the 
lack of one central authority, Muslim sages have not been able to arrive at one 
generally binding decision which would solve the issue for good.  
The first problem that divides the community of Muslim scholars, ulama, is the 
question whether to regard the bomber’s blowing himself up as committing an 
act of suicide or as a conscious self-sacrifice. 
The crucial factor for labelling the act one way or another is the intention of the 
perpetrator. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an influential Sunni cleric and a 
supporter of martyrdom operations in Palestine drew the distinction between 
the two as follows:  
“Suicide is an act or instance of killing oneself intentionally out of despair, and finding no outlet 
except putting an end to one’s life. On the other hand, martyrdom is a heroic act of choosing to 
suffer death in the cause of Allah, and that’s why it’s considered by most Muslim scholars as one 
of the greatest forms of jihad.”91 
The fact that bombers are not mentally-ill suicidal nihilists -- as was suggest by 
some Western observers in an attempt to explain the psychological motivation 
of the individual92 -- confirms also the leader of the Islamic Jihad: 
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“We do not take depressed people. If there were [even] a one-in-a-thousand chance that a 
person was suicidal, we would not allow him to martyr himself. In order to be a martyr bomber, 
you have to want to live.”93 
Suicide operations constitute a new phenomenon which was made possible by 
the invention of easily transportable explosives.94 As such, we find only few 
arguments in the traditional sources to either confirm or contradict the 
legitimacy of suicide missions. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
the final verdict is rather a matter of personal opinion which is often not free of 
personal sympathies and sentiments. And sometimes even political calculation 
plays its role. Given the ambiguous nature of the martyrdom operation and little 
relevance of the traditional texts to settle the existing controversy, the support 
for Palestinian martyrdom operations comes out more of solidarity with the 
Palestinian cause than of any other reason. As we have already indicated above, 
religion is part of everything in the Islamic world. Not in an “absolute” sense but 
in a way that it helps to shape all sorts of social and individual discourses, thus 
providing a meaningful narrative for many different situations. Suicide 
bombings in Palestine and their religious reasoning are only one of the 
examples. 
According to al-Qaradawi, as the weapon of last resort, “martyrdom operations 
are legitimate [in Palestine] because the Palestinians have no other effective 
means of self-defence.”95 But in other cases like in Iraq, suicide missions are not 
justifiable because Iraqis have other “resources with which to resist foreign 
occupation and [are] not obliged to employ martyrdom operations.”96 
Most of the ulama have followed this pattern and condemned al-Qaida as “an 
apostate footnote in the annals of Islamic history.”97 Thus, religious legitimacy 
for suicide bombings has been territorially limited and granted to Palestinians 
on a case-by-case basis.98  
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Generally, advocates of suicide missions enumerate following arguments in 
their support (as listed off by Nawwaf al-Takruri in his famous book 
Martyrdom Operations in the Legal Balance):  
 “They are a deterrent by means of causing terror among the enemy. 
 They cause the highest number of casualties on the part of the enemy 
with the fewest number of casualties on the part of the Muslims. 
 They equalize what would otherwise be unequal conflicts (such as that 
against Israel). 
 They cause the Israelis to think twice before perpetrating crimes 
against the Palestinians. 
 They cause happiness and fortitude to enter into the hearts of the 
Muslims, and despair to enter into their enemies. 
 They give the Muslim community the spirit of jihad and martyrdom, 
and cause Muslims to focus upon fighters and martyrs as examples 
rather than other popular heroes or symbols. 
 They bring non-Muslims to the knowledge of what is Islam.”99  
The gravity of the situation in Palestine was arguably the reason why the 
opposition to suicide operations confined to Palestine was relatively marginal 
among Muslim clerics. 100 In the face of overwhelming support for Palestinian 
martyrs, there has been a minority of ulama that opposed suicide attacks in 
principle, denouncing them as an evil method that contradicts fundamental 
principles of the Islamic faith. The contra-arguments usually put forward can be 
summarized as follows: 
 The operations are plain suicide, sin which sentences the person to an 
eternal suffering in hell, because the bomber “kills himself by himself” 
even before killing the others, thus acting on behalf of God. 
 Killing the innocent civilians, including children, women, and elderly 
people, or other Muslims who might be among the victims 
contravenes the Islamic laws of war. 
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 Who is and who is not a martyr is known to God only and there is 
always the possibility that the bomber acted out of the desire for fame 
or material well-being of his family (which is usually compensated 
after the operation). 
 Negative publicity surrounding suicide bombings harms and 
“dehumanizes” the Palestinian cause; their strategic value is therefore 
questionable.101 
Nevertheless, those ulama who have condemned martyrdom operations in 
Palestine belong to the outcast minority. Yet, despite the major agreement on 
the legitimacy of suicide missions in Palestine, Muslim sages have explicitly 
emphasized the exceptionality of the Palestinian cause and disapproved the use 
of suicide missions by other groups.102 This again demonstrates the complex 
role of religion within the Muslim world. It is not a simple set of instructions 
which an adherent has to strictly obey. Martyrdom is a complex phenomenon 
and even its religious justifications are complex because they take into account 
individual interests and contexts -- since the Palestinians are in a special 
situation, they also deserve special justifications. 
However, the support of ulama for the Palestinian cause not only served to the 
enhancement of religious aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but it 
involuntarily led to employment of the tactic in a massive scale by transnational 
Jihadist groups.103 
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6. HAMAS AND MARTYRDOM OPERATIONS 
But at no time is the blood of a shahid wasted. It does not flow on the ground. Every drop of it 
is turned into hundreds of thousands of drops, nay into tons of blood, and is transfused into 
the body of his society. That is why the noble Prophet has said, “God does not like any drop 
more than the drop of blood shed in his way.” Shahadat means the transfusion of blood into a 
society, especially into a society suffering from anemia. It is the shahid who infuses fresh 
blood into the veins of society. The distinctive characteristic of a shahid is that he charges the 
atmosphere with courage and zeal. He revives the spirit of valor and fortitude, courage and 
zeal, especially divine zeal, among the people who have lost it. That is why Islam is always in 
need of shuhada. The revival of courage is essential for the revival of a nation.104 
Ayatollah Murtada Mutahhari 
 
Martyrdom operations, in the Western academic discourse labelled as suicide 
terrorism, represent one of the distinctive features of contemporary radical 
Islam. In the course of previous chapters, we have explained the ideological 
background that bestows legitimacy upon Palestinian suicide bombings in the 
eyes of their perpetrators, Palestinian society, and also wider public arena of the 
Muslim world. However, the ideology itself is not sufficient to explain why the 
acts of suicide terrorism occur at this particular place in this particular time. It 
is due to the complexity of the phenomenon that requires complex, 
multidisciplinary approach. First of all, we have to take into consideration 
multiple levels of participants. Beyond personal participation, the complex web 
of suicide terrorism also involves organizations that make the decision whether 
or not to deploy this tactic and societies that respond to this decision.105  
The top of the pyramid is the level of individuals who decide to become the 
perpetrators of suicide attacks. Individuals are at the top of the pyramid not 
only in the terms of logistic but also because istishhad is ultimately a personal 
decision of a single individual. Analysts widely agree that determining the 
prototype of a suicide bomber is very difficult because personal motivations vary 
extensively. Moreover, the perpetrator often combines several motivations 
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simultaneously, among others the desire for vengeance, commitment either to 
the organization or to the community, and last but not least, the bomber might 
want to enjoy the rewards and benefits of being martyred.106  
There are only few characteristics that bombers have in common but those 
characteristics have little relevance to unravelling their individual motives. 
There is no real chance that the common traits could give us any clue. What we 
know is that the bombers are Muslims, usually in late teens or early twenties 
and unmarried. Yet, their social and educational background differs and 
sometimes they even come from outside the organization.107  
Since we were unable to conduct a field research, i.e. we did not speak to anyone 
who has planned to perpetrate an act of suicide terrorism, we are not qualified 
to make any assumption about personal motivations. Instead, we will focus on 
the two other levels which also play a part in adopting the tactic of suicide 
terrorism: strategies of organizations and roles of societies -- and 
especially how they intertwine. 
At this stage, we have access to information through a lot of literature on life in 
Palestinian territories, Palestinian society and its grievances, and also the 
Hamas movement, its presence in Palestine and the way it thinks. We have 
introduced a short summary of literature on the subject at the beginning of the 
paper, showing how diverse the attitude toward Hamas can be. In accordance 
with our preliminary statement, we will draw on the works that are firmly 
grounded in field research and have regard for the realities on the ground. The 
entanglement of Hamas’ policies with social norms will be in our main focus 
since Hamas does not exist in vacuum but is active within the Palestinian 
society. Hamas is a factor in shaping the Palestinian society as it is in effect 
subject to social influences. The movement has been growing within Palestine 
since its inception, operating on the grassroots levels. The very fact 
distinguishes Hamas from Fatah that resided outside Palestine for a large part 
of its history and supports the argument that to certain extent the movement’s 
ideology reflects popular sentiments. Which is not to say that public sentiments 
are pro-death. It rather means that the society understands things in a complex 
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fashion, linking together personal devotion, politics, and socio-economics 
whereas martyrdom is only a part of the equation. To introduce the reader into 
the context, we will present a short overview of the movement’s history at the 
first place. 
 
6.1 Origins of the Movement 
In its Charter issued in 1988, Hamas declares its affiliation to the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB), nowadays the most powerful Islamist movement of its kind 
that has branches throughout the Muslim world and is known as the “mother of 
all movements that comprise political Islam.”108 The Muslim Brotherhood was 
established in 1928 in Egypt as a Salafist-reformist movement aimed at 
restoration of traditional Islamic values and liberation of the Muslim world 
from colonial domination.109 Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, held the view that foreign presence in Palestine is a sign of a 
general deterioration of Islam and that armed struggle against the British and 
Israelis represents only a part of the effort to liberate the Palestinian people. 
Military activity has to go hand in hand with educating people toward Islam that 
would infuse the society with traditional religious values and make it morally 
steadfast.110  
Nevertheless, in the face of the British rule and increasing Jewish immigration 
to Palestine, the Brotherhood could not have stayed indifferent toward the 
Palestinian cause and soon it became the leading force behind the Palestinian 
resistance. The most prominent mujahid of those early years of the 
Brotherhood’s struggle against foreign intruders in Palestine was ‛Izz al-Din al-
Qassam who engaged in assassinations of British officials and Jewish 
immigrants. Al-Qassam was eventually killed by British forces in 1935, thus 
becoming a symbol of resistance and personal self-sacrifice for the sake of 
nation.111 Hamas sees itself as an extension of al-Qassam’s effort to liberate the 
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land of Palestine and out of respect to this figure, it named its military wing ‛Izz 
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.112 
Though the Muslim Brotherhood was present in Palestine even before the 
World War II, their first branch there was not officially opened until 1945. The 
new Palestinian Muslim Brothers instantly confirmed their “determination to 
defend the country by all means and [their] willingness to cooperate with all 
nationalistic bodies to that end.”113 They honoured their promise during the 
1948 war from which Israel emerged victorious as an independent state. The 
loss of most of Palestine and division of the remaining land between Jordan and 
Egypt had a serious impact on the Brotherhood’s future development.114 
Unlike Egypt that ruled the Gaza Strip, Jordan fully annexed the territory of the 
West Bank and the Palestinian MB merged with their Jordanian brethren into a 
single organization. They became a “loyal opposition” to the Jordanian king, 
avoiding confrontation with the regime that tolerated their activities in return.115 
They exerted some political power but subordinated their Palestinian agenda to 
the King’s will. Instead of pursuing military efforts to liberate Palestine, the 
Brotherhood focused on educational activities and proselytizing, thus becoming 
subject to public critique for such behaviour.116 
The Brotherhood in Gaza fell under the Egyptian rule. Egypt did not annex the 
Gaza Strip but it imposed military administration over the territory. Therefore, 
the Palestinian MB continued to form a separate organization there, although 
they had a close connection to their counterparts in Cairo. They were also 
governed in line with the Nasserist regime’s policy toward their Egyptian 
brethren. As a consequence, the 1954 crackdown by Nasser on the Egyptian MB 
constituted a serious blow for Gaza’s branch as well. 117 
Until then, the Gazan Brothers represented the “foremost political movement in 
the Gaza Strip” and engaged actively in military resistance.118 However, when 
they were pronounced illegal in the mid 1950s, they had to go underground and 
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operate clandestinely. This unwelcomed development forced the movement to 
change its strategy of liberating Palestine. The Gazan Brotherhood decided to 
put off an open confrontation with Israel and give a priority to the non-violent 
part of liberating Palestinian land and the people.119 Their aim was to call to 
Islam by educating, proselytizing and conducting social activities. The MB called 
this process “preparing the generations” of Palestinians that would eventually 
be able to accomplish the mission of liberation.120 They rationalized the choice 
to renounce violence by emphasizing the spiritual dimension of the conflict in 
Palestine, which lead to their being accused of cowardice by some of their 
members who were keen to fight. Those members led by Khalid al-Wazir left the 
Brotherhood and set up a movement of their own which became known as 
Fatah.121 
But Fatah forsook the religious ideology and embarked on secular nationalism. 
The newly born leftist movement took the head in military resistance against 
Israel on the grounds that Palestinians could not wait any longer for the Arab 
regimes to liberate their land but they had to take the initiative into their own 
hands.122 Fatah soon outpaced the Brotherhood in popularity and since then, it 
has been the most prominent adversary to Islamist parties in Palestine. The 
Brotherhood in Gaza tried to defend its position, arguing that the alternative is 
“either to launch guerrilla warfare against Israel, as the PLO had done, using the same 
individuals who had grown up under regimes and ideologies distant from Islam -- so that one is 
doomed to repeat the errors of the past; or to launch a comprehensive effort at cultural 
renaissance designed to instill true Islam in the soul of the individual and, following that 
renaissance, to embark on the path to liberation.”123 
However, to re-emerge as a powerful political player they had to wait until the 
1970s.   
The window of opportunity opened again in 1967 when Israel took control over 
the Palestinian territories. The Brotherhood did not immediately change its 
strategy of passive resistance by calling people back to Islam but it benefited 
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from the new situation. Contrary to the Nasserist Egypt, Israel enabled the 
Islamist movement and its activities to flourish, considering it a non-violent 
opposition to leftist militants. The ties and cooperation between the 
Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were renewed again.124 
Nevertheless, the MB in the Gaza Strip stood at the forefront and Gaza became 
the stronghold of the Brotherhood and later of the Hamas movement as well.125 
Until the 1980s, the social and institutional infrastructure of the Brotherhood 
grew extensively under the supervision of Gazan MB’s spiritual leader Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin. Grave socio-economic conditions and atmosphere of growing 
religiosity among people created right conditions for the Brotherhood’s appeal 
as an alternative to secular leftist ideologies.126 The most important milestone of 
the MB’s activity in the Gaza Strip was the establishment of the Islamic Centre 
(al-Mujamma‛ al-islami) in 1973, that  
“became the base for development, administration, and control of religious and educational 
Islamic institutions in the Gaza Strip… The Mujamma‛ followed the MB’s traditional practice of 
applying the Islamic duty of charity (zakat) to the poor as a central avenue for social infiltration 
and expansion of its public support among the needy. The movement set up kindergartens and 
schools, a blood bank, medical clinics, vocal education centers for women, and youth and sport 
clubs. All these activities revolved around the mosque, combining worship, education, and social 
welfare with subsidized services such as medical treatment, children’s day care, free meals, and 
sport clubs.”127         
The position of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was further strengthened 
in 1982 when Israeli troops expelled the PLO from southern Lebanon where it 
relocated its headquarters after it had been forced out of Jordan in 1970. The 
defeat of the PLO in Lebanon left the organization “militarily and politically 
bankrupt.”128 As a result, it shifted its focus “from military to political action.” 
This development aroused feelings of hopelessness among the Palestinians who 
had thought that a change was going to come.129 
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Yet, at the beginning of the 1980s the monopoly of the Muslim Brotherhood 
over the religious life in Palestine was challenged by the creation of the Islamic 
Jihad -- a splinter group of the MB founded by those Brothers who protested 
over its refusal to join military struggle against Israel alongside with the leftist 
movements.130 Now the Brotherhood found itself in even worse situation than at 
the time when Fatah split off because the Islamic Jihad did not trade off its 
religiosity for the sake of armed resistance -- it rather “constituted a marriage 
between Islam and the gun; it was a way of engaging in resistance activities in 
the armour of an Islamic identity.”131 But contrary to the Brotherhood, Islam of 
the Islamic Jihad was never communal or people-based. The Islamic Jihad is 
not committed to social welfare, it is exclusively a fundamentalist militant 
operation committed to fighting Israel. In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
concern with the well-being of the community remained unchallenged. 
The relative weakness of the opposition and rising call for military action 
against Israeli occupation among their younger members gradually made the 
Brotherhood undergo a strategic shift and slowly embark on military resistance 
against Israel,132 thus equating the aim of re-Islamizing the society with the goal 
of liberating the land of Palestine.133 In 1983 the Palestinian Muslim Brothers 
started to systematically prepare for an open armed confrontation and when the 
popular rebellion in 1987 suddenly erupted, they were ready to join the intifada. 
A new “strong arm” of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was set up for that 
purpose and named Harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya. It got to be known 
under its acronym “Hamas”.134 Khaled Hroub explains the connection between 
the outbreak of the first intifada and the creation of Hamas as follows: 
“In a sense, the joint eruption of the intifada and emergence of Hamas was the culmination of 
two parallel, but not separate, curves of changes, one national and other partisan. While the first 
reflected the general Palestinian mood toward the deadlock that was facing their national cause, 
the second represented the increasing consciousness of resistance and confrontation among the 
Palestinian Islamists.”135  
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6.2 Hamas’ Strategy and Logic behind the Use of Suicide Missions 
In this section, we will try to demonstrate the complexity and multifocal nature 
of the suicide terrorism by using the Palestinian Hamas as an example of 
complex justifications for those acts, justifications that are derived from specific 
social, political, and socio-economic realities on the ground. At the same time, 
we will try to present the view from within Hamas, how the movement sees itself 
and what logic it uses to justify its behaviour. 
To begin with, Hamas’ strategy goals are concisely expressed in the movement’s 
self-written Introductory Memorandum which dates back to 1993: 
“Based on our understanding of the struggle with the Zionist enemy, who is associated with the 
Western Project to bring the Arab Islamic umma under the domination of Western culture, to 
make it dependent on the West, and to perpetuate its underdevelopment, and being aware of the 
complexities of the international and regional environment with the clear imbalance of power 
favoring the Zionist-American alliance, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) bases its 
strategy of resisting the Zionist settler occupation of Palestine on the following: 
1. The Palestinian people are the direct target of the Zionist settler occupation. Therefore, 
they must bear the main burden of resisting the unjust occupation. This is why Hamas 
seeks to mobilize the full potential of the Palestinian people and channel it into steadfast 
resistance against the usurper. 
2. Palestine is the terrain for confrontation with the enemy. The Arab and Islamic 
countries are regions from which our Palestinian people can draw support, particularly 
political, informational, and financial support; but the bloody confrontation with our 
Zionist enemy must take place on the sacred soil of Palestine… 
3. There must be incessant resistance to and confrontation with the enemy in Palestine 
until we achieve victory and liberation. Jihad for the cause of God is our objective in that 
confrontation. The best method of resistance is to do battle with the soldiers of the 
enemy and destroy their armor. 
4. It is in our view that political action is one of the means for pursuing jihad against the 
Zionist enemy. Its objective should be to strengthen the endurance of our people in their 
jihad against the occupation; to mobilize the forces of our people and our umma in 
defense of our cause; to defend the rights of our people; and to present their just cause 
to the international community.”136 
As indicated in the Memorandum, Hamas maintains that the best method of 
warfare is fighting “the soldiers of the enemy.” Yet, soon after publishing the 
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Memorandum it resorted to violence against civilian population inside Israel 
using “human bombs,” a controversial strategy that would -- contrary to Hamas’ 
proclaimed aims -- not only ruin the movement’s image at the international 
stage but also harm the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle for statehood. This 
seeming contradiction is another example of Hamas’ multifaceted nature and its 
ability to encapsulate ostensibly incompatible policies. 
However, it would be incorrect to assume that Hamas uses suicide missions 
thoughtlessly or that Hamas’ activists blow themselves up out of religious 
fanaticism without taking into consideration possible consequences of such 
deeds. We again arrive at the point where it is necessary to highlight the 
complexity of the phenomenon. First of all, religion does not lead to violence or 
suicidal behaviour per se; it is only a certain way of interpreting religious 
dogmas that defines the use of suicide attacks as a means of warfare. However, 
appropriate conditions are needed for this particular interpretation to become 
public opinion. God’s law does not dictate to a person to commit a suicide for 
His sake. Life is the most sacred value and can be sacrificed only as a last resort 
when there is no other option left. If there are any other weapons on disposal 
they should be used preferentially. The same goes for attacking civilians -- the 
religion prohibits killing children, women or elderly people, yet taking up arms 
against them can be justifiable under exceptional circumstances: when they 
participate in a war by providing either material or moral assistance, and when 
the harm on them is inevitable because they are either used as human shields or 
are indistinguishable from soldiers.137 The matter of exceptionality in using 
suicide attacks against civilians was also pointed out by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, 
the spiritual leader of Hamas, in an interview with Anat Berko: 
“Yassin:  According to our religion, a man must make sure to distance himself from 
innocent children and women and old men. It is forbidden by Islam to kill them 
or harm them, but in war things happen that contradict [religious] principles… 
[Sometimes there are] mistakes, for example, Israel in the [first] war in south 
Lebanon killed 100 people, and weren’t they civilians? That is, either by mistake 
or in retaliation, one thing for another. You kill children, you kill women, I take 
my revenge and by defending myself I pay you back, an eye for an eye, a tooth 
for a tooth. That’s what happens in war and that means that for us a warrior kills 
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his enemy to settle the score, not to kill women and old men, but the minute he 
sees his sister was killed, his mother or his father, he wants to cause the same 
deaths the enemy caused him.... 
Author: So then he is not obeying a religious commandment, he is taking revenge 
according to his own private criteria? 
Yassin: No, not his criteria. Islam gave him clear instructions, but if you conspire 
against me, then I conspire against you. Allah said, if someone does something 
to hurt you, respond in the same way and hurt him. 
Author: Is that written in Qur’an? 
Yassin: Of course. If you are injured, respond in the same way you were injured. But 
there is a stage higher than that where the Qur’an says it is preferable to be 
restrained and patient, etc., and leave the matter in the hands of Allah. That is, 
patience and leaving the matter to Allah is a higher level. 
Author: Honorable sheikh, we have seen the recent attacks, which were carried out on 
buses and were not the response of a victim who sought revenge the same way 
he was hurt, but of people who planned a series of attacks which were similar to 
one another. Isn’t that a well-thought out policy, a policy of premeditation, of 
people who didn’t choose the option of patience and waiting, but decided to 
attack civilians on buses? In your opinion, is that the proper response, to kill 
civilians on public transportation? 
Yassin: That goes back to what we said before, because during the intifada, you see your 
mother die, your brother, your sister, and you control yourself, you are 
restrained, for a year or two, three, and that’s enough. Your heart awakens and 
suffers more and more and then it’s enough, your heart can’t bear any more, it’s 
the chain of behavior of the Israeli army and the occupation, the accumulated 
response of actions against it. 
Author: That is, those actions are the correct response, ideologically and religiously, to 
the series of Israeli actions against Arabs, which in your view was the 
justification for the attacks carried out in Israel. 
Yassin:  You call it “the correct response.” You are not speaking the truth. It is not the 
correct response, but rather an extraordinary response. That is, an exceptional 
situation, an emergency in view of the existing situation. That is not the source, 
because [the act] is forbidden at the source, because children and women, old 
people, civilians, conspiring against them is forbidden at the source, and if you 
act against them it is an exceptional act, and not genuine. It is not the correct 
solution, but rather an irregular action.”138 
In line with the Qura’nic teaching of reciprocity about “an eye for an eye”, 
Hamas has usually interpreted the suicide attacks as a response to killing of 
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Palestinian civilians.139 Until 1994, Hamas followed its statement in the 
Memorandum and confined its armed struggle to the military targets only. 
However, when the Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein shoot to death 29 
Palestinians in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron in February 1994, Hamas 
dispatched its very first human bomb in retaliation for the massacre of 
worshipers.140 The movement’s policy of reciprocity in employing suicide 
attacks was articulated by Khalid Mash’al, the political leader of Hamas, in one 
of the interviews for a Canadian TV channel: 
“We took the initiative more than ten years ago to propose sparing civilians on both sides of the 
conflict. We said we were prepared to stop the martyrdom operations, provided Israel also stops 
killing civilians including women, children and the elderly and stops destroying homes. Should 
Israel stop, we would be ready to stop. But Israel refused.”141   
In the same TV interview, Khalid Mish’al also explains that the reason for 
employing martyrdom operations lies in the conviction that Palestinians have 
no other alternative to effectively resist the oppression and to defend themselves 
from the violence inflicted upon them. Therefore their extreme situation calls 
for extreme solutions: 
“Martyrdom operations are an act of legitimate self-defense forced on us because the battle 
between us and Israel is not between equal sides and because the Israeli occupation has not left 
our land and no one has done us justice. We do know that … many sympathizers [with the 
Palestinians] around the world do not understand the issue of the martyrdom operations which 
may prompt them to reconsider their sympathy. However, we ask, ‛what is the alternative?’ 
There is no alternative. Had the Palestinians people found the alternative they would have done 
without the resistance and without the martyrdom operations.”142 
Thus, the gravity of the situation in Palestine allows Hamas to build on the 
religious, cultural and historical memory of the Palestinians for a pursuit of its 
interpretation of Islam. Yet, this interpretation is neither rigid nor unchanging. 
It is subject to pragmatic calculations and adaptations to new conditions. The 
same Khalid Mish’al, who several years ago defined martyrdom operations as 
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the only alternative left for Palestinians, has now been endorsing popular non-
violent resistance over armed struggle.143  
Many studies suggest that Hamas uses suicide missions instrumentally as a 
powerful tactic of warfare that is capable of inflicting a lot of damage at 
minimum cost. In fact, this coldly rational deliberation is yet another level of 
policy calculations incumbent upon an organization with scarce resources which 
operates clandestinely. Under such circumstances, the unconventional nature of 
human bombs counterbalances the strategic disadvantage on the part of the 
underprivileged group.144 Indeed, by employing suicide bombings during the 
second intifada, Hamas and other Palestinian factions achieved certain parity in 
the numbers of victims among Israelis in comparison to the deaths of 
Palestinians -- contrary to the striking imbalance in the figures in the past.145 
Yet, suicide attacks not only compensate for the technological 
underdevelopment and lack of resources but also have a strong psychological 
impact on the public that was hit by suicide terrorism. Beyond dispersing fear 
and feelings of insecurity among Israelis, Hamas wants to turn Palestine into 
the land which is repelling to Jewish population in order to disrupt “the 
structure of Zionist society,” to abort Jewish immigration programs from 
abroad as well as tourism.146 Nevertheless, the Israeli public is not the only 
recipient of the message that the suicide attacks are meant to deliver.  
At the opposite receiving end is the Palestinian society. We have demonstrated 
above that Hamas is concerned with the well-being and betterment of the 
community. Since the movement perceives political activity as a way of 
achieving this, it is naturally interested in public opinion. Hamas is a product of 
the Palestinian society; it is not the al-Qaeda which pursues its political and 
religious goals no matter what, without any interest in social welfare. Hamas 
seeks out public support for its policies including suicide operations. Yet, it 
would not be plausible to argue that Hamas gains electoral support by covertly 
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brainwashing the Palestinian population as a number of analysts believe.147 The 
act of martyrdom has to be communicated to the target group, whereas the 
audience has to be responsive to that particular narrative. This is not to argue 
that the Palestinian society possesses collective suicidal tendencies or that it 
embraces death over life. The communication is rather based on the fact that 
culturally and historically the society perceives martyrdom as an integral part of 
warfare. Hence, the crucial condition for an act to be accepted as martyrdom is 
an audience that shares the same system of values as a communicator:148  
“Ability to advertise the cause of the martyr is the crucible upon which the effective martyrdom 
narrative is to be judged. In reading over history’s rejected narratives, the reasons for their 
failure become clear. These reasons include insufficient pathos, inability to communicate or 
connect with the audience, an unreceptive audience or an inappropriate time for a given theme 
of martyrdom. Sometimes martyrdom narratives fail to be effective because the market is 
saturated with blood and gore, too jaded to be shocked, or unable to identify with the situation 
portrayed in the narrative. Thus, while there are many martyrs to be found in history, few are 
chosen to be representative of a given moment, belief system or people.”149 
We have shown how strongly the Islamic values are incorporated into the 
collective identity, and how important role the religion plays in social and 
cultural terms. And one of the Hamas’ aims is to even strengthen the societal 
role of Islam. Despite the emphasis on martyrdom as one of the main religious 
features, Hamas primarily understands Islam as a regulator of a functional, vital 
society. Islam fulfils a great deal of constructive roles within the society and 
should not be reduced to an ideology leading to death.   
In the movement’s view, jihad and Islamization go hand in hand and 
complement each other. This goes back to the Muslim Brotherhood’s policy of 
multiple goals of pursuing jihad against imperialists and reviving Islamic 
values, as we have already described in the previous section. Hamas has 
continued in this tradition and maintained that for the Palestinians to be able to 
resist the corruptive impacts of the occupation they have to be morally and 
spiritually steadfast, hence its interest in communal welfare and da‛wa. At this 
point we should stress again that Hamas does not run its social network in order 
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to breed crowds of suicide bombers who would be willing to die for Hamas’ 
ideology. Spiritual and moral values are meant to infuse one’s life with a deep, 
inner meaning. In this sense, jihad is a part of a responsible life and martyrdom 
is the culmination of life lived meaningfully. Presumably only those who are 
concerned with justice and state of affairs in their community would be 
ultimately willing to sacrifice their own life for the communal well-being. This 
aspect is especially important in the case of the Palestinians who stand at the 
forefront of the struggle with the enemy. They often refer to themselves as 
murabitun, i.e. “inhabitants of the frontier”, who defended the borders of the 
land of Islam during the time of Muslim conquest.150 Thus, it is believed that 
their devotion to the cause and selflessness are the most powerful assets in the 
fight against the enemy. A fragment of a Hamas’ leaflet that was distributed 
among Palestinians during the first intifada demonstrates the emphasis on this 
particular narrative:   
“The hundreds of wounded and tens of martyrs who sacrificed their lives during the 
week for the sake of Allah and for the sake of the pride and honor of the nation, for the sake of 
restoring our rights in the homeland, for the sake of hoisting the banner of Allah over the land -- 
are a correct expression of the spirit of sacrifice and selfless devotion with which our people is 
imbued, and demonstrated to the world that a people that is ready to sacrifice its life will not die. 
 The Jews must understand that despite their restrictions, their prisons, and detention 
camps, and despite our people’s suffering in the shadow of the criminal occupation, and despite 
the torrents of blood that flow daily, despite the wounds, our people is great in the capacity to 
suffer and to be steadfast in the face of their arrogance and despotism, greater than their 
patience. Let them know that our sons and youngsters will stand firm in the face of their policy 
of violence, for they love [the promised] paradise more than our enemies love the life of this 
world.  
 The uprising of our murabit people in the occupied land is an act of defiance against the 
occupation and the pressures, against the policy of dispossession of the land and the planting of 
the settlements, against the Zionist policy of oppression. The uprising is meant to arouse the 
conscience of those who run after the anemic peace, after empty international conferences, after 
bad unilateral compromises like Camp David. Let them know well that Islam is the solution and 
the alternative! 
 Let the contemptuous settlers know that our people is set in its way -- the way that 
entails martyrdom in a holy war and the way of sacrifice. 
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 Our people is known for its self-sacrifice. The policy of the military and of the settlers 
will be of no avail, and all their efforts to eradicate our people will fail, despite their bullets, their 
agents, and their humiliations. 
 Let them know this: violence begets violence, murder breeds murder, and he was right 
who said:  
‛The drowning person is not afraid to get wet.’ 
 And to the criminal Zionists! 
 Remove your hands from our people, our cities, our camps, and our villages! Our 
struggle against you is a struggle of faith, existence, and life. 
 Let the world know that the Jews have perpetrated Nazi crimes against our people, and 
that they will yet drink from the same cup.”151 
‛Abd al-‛Aziz al-Rantisi, one of the founding fathers of Hamas, expressed a 
similar view on the importance of self-sacrifice for the endurance of the 
Palestinian society. According to al-Rantisi,  
“the culture of martyrdom … ‛distinguishes the Palestinian people’ from others, and represents 
the strongest weapon the Palestinians posses, which no one can defeat or take away from them. 
It is not an imported weapon and it does not require foreign experts to operate, but it emerged 
from the depths of Palestinian soul, suffering and heroism. Thanks to it and in contrast to the 
past, the Palestinians are now able to control and direct the course of events. Rantisi credited 
the success of Palestinian resistance not to weapons or numbers but to the fact that those who 
were ready to die prevailed over those who feared death, and he observed that nations which 
acquire honor in history do so through death.”152 
It should be noted that the culture of martyrdom is not the same as the culture 
of death. Martyrdom is not craving for death; martyrdom is craving for a 
meaningful life. In compliance with the tradition, shuhada are not dead, they 
live with Allah and their deed is believed to have a vitalizing effect on the society 
and creating a new life153 because  
“like the heart, a shahid sends his own blood into the half-dead body of the dying society, whose 
children have lost faith in themselves, which is slowly approaching death, which has accepted 
submission, which has forgotten its responsibility, which is alienated from humanity, and in 
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which there is no life, movement, and creativity. The greatest miracle of shahadat is giving to a 
generation a renewed faith in itself.”154  
This way, the act of istishhad plays a social role, is charged with cultural and 
popular meaning and thus “collectively significant” for the whole community.155 
Under particular conditions the particular religious concept can be activated to 
support the cause. If a nation perceives itself in a marginalized position and 
feels that its security, identity, and even the very existence are put in danger, it 
is very likely that it will recourse to a radical ideology. The Palestinians see 
themselves as victims of unjust treatment who are subject to disproportionate 
use of force by Israeli military, which they have no resources to contest 
against.156 In this situation, the suicide operations are a “symbolic 
empowerment” of a dying nation, they give the forceless people a feeling of 
strength, they symbolize “the ability of the weak to resist the strong.”157 Due to 
martyrdom operations, the Palestinians become the masters of their fate again, 
because it is only them who are responsible for their own death that is an 
“expression of independence that is long sought and denied.”158 Their 
selflessness serves a higher principle and their self-sacrifice gives the nation 
courage and keeps it alive.  
This narrative is also supported by the Palestinian and Arabic media in general 
which naturally leads to ratcheting the popular sentiments up.159 On the top of 
that, no official authority has ever denounced this kind of violence in a serious 
manner. We have shown above that religious authorities across the Middle East 
largely supported the suicide bombings as a legitimate means of Palestinian 
self-defence in the face of Israeli military superiority. The Palestinian Authority 
alike did not condemn the suicide operations, although it was in the position of 
doing so.160 What is more, Yasser Arafat’s ruling faction Fatah indirectly 
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participated in this very kind of violence via its military arm called Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigades, partly in an attempt to stand to the growing popularity of 
Islamist groups like Hamas that were gaining electoral support by carrying out 
suicide campaigns.161 Secular factions like Fatah or the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine did not have a problem with using the same rhetoric as 
Islamic movements and referring to the suicide bombers as shuhada, because 
Islam serves as a source of cultural and social identity, as we argued in the 
previous chapters. 
To sum up, the combination of popular feelings of victimization, injustice, and 
in-proportionality of the conflict, the formidable economic situation, the 
continuing cycle of violence, along with Hamas’ commitment to the community, 
and its radical understanding of the politics of the struggle, creates perfect 
conditions for the organization to promote its version of Islam and its 
interpretation of religious believes. And more importantly -- they are successful 
in gaining popular support for it.  
  
                                                          





In the course of the paper, the prime objective was to demonstrate the 
multifocal nature of suicide terrorism and the need to see things from multiple 
perspectives while studying on the subject. Religion and religious concepts like 
martyrdom are sometimes seen as very simple but the opposite is true. Religion 
within the Islamic world cannot be understood as a set of absolute truths that 
are binding in their literal sense. Islam rather serves as an omnipresent source 
of all sorts of narratives and provides a platform in which reasoning for a 
particular action can be placed.  
Martyrdom is a phenomenon which embodies these complexities. It is a climax 
of death and a celebration of life. Some of its perpetrators see it as a weapon of 
utmost destruction. Others see it as an ultimate expression of activism and 
protest. The act of martyrdom is grounded in such interlocking context. It may 
provide livelihood for the family of a shahid while exacting a heavy price from 
his family and community at the same time.  
In the history of Islam, martyrdom has always been looked at as the most 
desirable way of death. Dying as a martyr reflects the devotion of a believer to 
the cause and his readiness to make the ultimate sacrifice for the well-being of 
his community. As a meritorious act, martyrdom should be actively sought out; 
it is not understood as being imposed passively upon a believer. Istishhad is 
rather a deliberate decision of a Muslim who is a responsible member of a 
community and has no other option left to uproot a wrongdoing which takes 
place in his society. 
In this sense, martyrdom shall not be seen as a celebration of death because 
there is a lot of life in it. Through a religious perspective, martyrdom is an act of 
living, a product of life lived meaningfully and responsibly. As such, martyrdom 
brings to the forefront the dimensions of religion and religiosity often 
considered separate from it. Culture, history and economics manifest 
prominently in the practice and ideas of religion in the Middle East. Examining 
a phenomenon as “religious” solely through the perspective of scriptural texts 
misses much with regard to religion’s motivating and organizing powers. 
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The commitment to a responsible life is one dimension of Hamas’ complex 
dynamics. On the grassroots level, the movement runs an extensive network of 
social services that cannot be reduced to a tool “in the service of jihad”162 or an 
instrument of political opportunism. We have also disproved the assumption 
that Hamas gains popular support through brainwashing of the Palestinians 
with the aim to recruit prospective suicide bombers. To be able to promote the 
cause of the martyr, Hamas (or any other Palestinian faction) has an essential 
need in audience responsive to that particular narrative. The act of martyrdom 
expresses certain cultural values that have significance not only for the 
perpetrator but also for the wider public which shares similar system of values. 
This is an important precondition that in combination with other factors makes 
such narrative attractive to a number of Palestinians.  
Although the martyrdom operations in Palestine enjoy a massive support, 
Islamic jurisprudents have not arrived to a definite verdict whether these self-
immolations indeed represent an act of self-sacrifice or whether they are mere 
suicides. What is seen legitimate in Palestine is not allowed in other places like 
Iraq where the prevailing conditions are different. This fact again points out to 
the societal role of Islam that takes into account different contexts.  
Another problematic issue of martyrdom missions from the juridical point of 
view is the matter of targeting civilians. Islamic law of warfare forbids killing of 
children, women and elderly people. However, under specific circumstances, 
exceptions exist even to this strict prohibition. Since the Palestinians perceive 
themselves in an impasse as victims of an aggression with no resources to resist 
the adversary, suicide missions which claim lives of civilians are deemed to be a 
legitimate means of self-defence. Again, contexts and interests matter. 
Hamas is a political Islamist movement which operates on the grassroots level 
within the society. As such, it has to be responsive to the society’s needs and 
demands, not like global Salafi-Jihadists who isolate themselves from their own 
communities because they deem themselves to be the only practitioners of the 
pure Islam. And despite the recent development in Egypt which has brought the 
removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power, political Islam is on the rise 
                                                          




and will continue to shape regional and global politics in the years to come. 
Thus, it cannot be reduced to fundamentalism on the one hand or political 
calculation on the other. Rather, it must be recognized as a phenomenon full of 
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